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The Primacy of the Political aims to cover much historical ground as it describes various 
political moves toward and away from democracy from the Ancient Greeks through the 
French and American Revolution. Dick Howard is interested in political thought as it 
wavers between what he calls “politics” and “antipolitics.” While he never gives a clear 
definition of these two terms, he implies throughout that politics is that which aims to 
govern citizens in a way that acknowledges equality and legitimizes its use of force to 
rule. The “antipolitical” then, denounces or corrodes such moves toward equality and 
legitimacy. Howard’s emphasis on political thought is couched in concrete examples 
from political history. In each chapter he focuses on thinkers of the time who seek to 
explain how authority is legitimized—establishing the elusive political or supporting the 
antipolitical. In this review I will focus on the main thinkers presented in each chapter. 
Howard is very thorough and offers many gems of insight. Yet, the book is dense and is 
more historical than philosophical; Howard often leaves out the analysis or further 
explanation for which a more serious student of philosophy may yearn. Still, Howard’s 
contribution is significant; he creates a cohesive picture of political thought as it 
vacillates between legitimate and illegitimate rule. 
 
Howard sets the foundation for his entire book in chapter one. He outlines both Plato and 
Aristotle’s political theories and their quest to establish legitimacy. Here, he argues that  
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Plato’s theory is largely antipolitical while Aristotle’s is political. He then draws on this 
foundation throughout the book comparing different theories and thinkers to their 
Platonic or Aristotelian roots. Howard writes, “Plato’s attitude toward democracy was 
influenced by what appears to be democracy’s original sin: the trial and condemnation of 
Socrates…That verdict seems to prove the incompatibility of the philosophical quest for 
truth with the equal participation of citizens in the democratic city” (37). This is because 
for Plato, normal citizens cannot be trusted to decipher what is required for a good life. 
Knowledge about the good life requires philosophical expertise, or someone who has 
emerged from the “cave” to see the real world. Because Plato turns away from the 
participation of all citizens in the governing process, Howard argues that he promotes an 
anitpolitics. Howard provides a masterful summary of Plato’s arguments in The Republic. 
He writes:  
 
The major difference between democracy and tyranny [for Plato] lies 
simply in the number of persons who rule, and the height of freedom 
coincides with the depth of servitude. The ground of his argument is his 
philosophical insistence that nothing but the rule of reason can create 
power that is legitimate and authority that is just. The strength of this 
philosophical imperative is shown by his ability to criticize all other forms 
of political life. The philosophical goal (more than his hatred for the 
regime that killed Socrates) in the last resort explains Plato’s critique of 
democracy. But, his ideal city remains a thought construction; in this 
sense, it is an antipolitical utopia rather than a positive political form of 
rule. Plato sets philosophy and democracy, which were born together in 
Athens, on separate paths that will meet rarely in the course of human 
history (58). 
 
In the same chapter, Howard turns to Aristotle who also played a powerful role in 
shaping political thought in Ancient Greece. Aristotle criticizes Plato’s antipolitical ideas 
and aims to move in a different direction that embraces “unity, universality, and 
lawfulness” (61). As Howard carefully teases out Aristotle’s political thought, he draws a 
rich distinction between Aristotle’s rules for the household (the oikos) and the political 
(the polis). This distinction makes Howard’s summary particularly insightful. The polis 
exists to help citizens achieve a good life while the oikos exists to help people get the 
material things they need to live. The poor must manage the day to day details of the 
oikos in order to gather the necessary materials to survive. The rich are able to leave these 
details to those who serve them and concentrate on fulfilling a good life—more 
theoretical wisdom. For Aristotle, this generates problems for a democracy, which is rule 
by all citizens, both wealthy and poor because they will pursue different goals dictated by 
their economic interests (76). For these reasons, Aristotle advocates a rule by a middle 
class (a polity) that is neither a democracy nor an oligarchy. His ideas are considered by 
Howard to be “political”—that is legitimate in the eyes of citizens—because a polity will 




balance the needs of actual, particular citizens, despite their economic standing within 
society. The conclusions of this chapter became more obvious to me only after I had read 
further in the book. For this reason, I would have liked Howard to more explicitly draw 
his conclusions at this early point in the book.  
 
In chapter 2 Howard focuses on three main thinkers to help him paint a picture of the rise 
and fall of the Roman Empire: Titus Livy, Polybius, and Marcus Tullius Cicero. Rome 
emerges as a world power as a republican democracy that aims to grant its citizens 
equality before the law and freedom to pursue their own interests. Yet, this political 
structure does not last and in the end Rome moves toward the antipolitical and to imperial 
rule. Livy, alive during this transition, writes about “the virtues of a people for whom 
political freedom was the ultimate value to which all must be sacrificed” (87).  Howard 
explains through Livy that this freedom is grounded in law. While conflict existed 
between the various political players (patrician and plebian as well as senator and 
tribune), this conflict was regulated by the law and thus did not get out of hand.  
 
Also in chapter 2, Howard examines Greek historian and philosopher, Polybius, whom he 
argues compliments Livy’s account. While Livy focuses on virtue, Polybius’s account 
gives more attention to the institutional structures of the Roman republic and how they 
balance power and avoid conflict, learning from their interactions, both positive and 
negative. The government consists of two co-consuls who inherit the powers of the 
monarch. Yet, this power is limited because each consul is able to veto the other and they 
have very restricted term limits. The Senate, which had previously been the advisor to the 
monarch, is made up of the patricians—or the aristocrats—and regulates revenue and 
expenses as well as construction projects (of which there were many). Polybius, 
according to Howard, argues that the Senate’s power is legitimized by its “capacity as an 
established and long serving institution composed of wealthy and admired patricians to 
look beyond immediate needs and personal political advantage” (106). The people then 
make up the “democratic element of the constitution” and have the power to ratify 
treaties as well as serve as jurors (106). Like Livy, Polybius seems to argue that this 
institutional balance of power works because “Romans accepted individual enrichment 
only by reputable means” (110). Yet, this reliance on those in power to serve the common 
good rather than their own individual good ultimately is a weakness of the Roman 
Empire.  
 
Howard then looks to Cicero and his account of Roman power. Like Livy and Polybius, 
Cicero discusses both the morality required by the citizens and the structure of the 
government. Howard examines Cicero’s On the Commonwealth as well as On the Laws. 
He argues that, “the basis of both works is a stoic political theory that, in spite of Cicero’s 
political intent, gives them both an antipolitical orientation. In the first case, the politician 
is reduced to moral imprecations; in the second, the republic’s legal institutions leave no 
place for the citizen’s action” (113). Howard explains that Cicero believes that human 




laws are only legitimate when they do not contradict natural laws. Because they are based 
on reason, Cicero seems to believe that everyone will embrace the law and when they do 
not, a decline in the empire is inevitable. This is another point where I would like to see 
more analysis by Howard. I can see that if citizens come to divergent conclusions about 
what is reasonable, they may be at a loss as to how to solve this dilemma. Howard is so 
familiar with this history; I would find it helpful for him to explain more fully why this is 
antipolitical.  
 
Howard ends chapter 2 by discussing the turn toward Christianity and the ideas of Paul of 
Tarsus. As the Roman republic declines, Howard argues that Pauline Christianity steps in 
“to offer meaning where public life itself was stripped of significance” (118). Paul 
overturns the Jewish idea that adherence to rules is what gives life meaning and marks 
one as saved. Rather, for Paul, it is faith in God that leads one to a life rich in meaning 
and true salvation. Yet, despite his belief in the universality of Christ’s message, Paul 
does not challenge political structures of taxation or slavery. For Howard, this makes 
Paul’s political ideas antipolitical because, for Paul, legitimacy now resides in the 
spiritual world rather than the secular. Howard’s discussion of Paul serves as a bridge to 
his next chapter where he discusses the conflict between the sacred and the secular.  
 
In chapter 3, Howard wrestles with the role of the church throughout medieval times and 
how church doctrine affects political life. Perhaps because he has prefaced much of this 
political thought as antipolitical in his closing remarks in chapter 2, in this chapter, 
Howard rarely points out when things are antipolitical. While he covers much ground and 
I find his synthesis of this material excellent, I again would like to see more overt 
analysis. Howard argues that just as all political institutions must establish some kind of 
legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects, so too must the church. Yet, the church must 
work to justify its authority in both spiritual matters as well as its control over secular 
life. It is in the secular world where things get sticky for the church and conflict arises 
with the secular authorities and the citizens themselves.   
 
Howard begins chapter 3 by looking at St. Augustine of Hippo’s work City of God. 
Augustine argues that there is value to life and participation in the secular world, yet 
ultimately the Christian should be concerned with what is to come in the afterlife. On this 
view, the world is a sinful place that lacks meaning without faith. Yet, secular authorities 
are necessary to help citizens subdue their sinful nature, exercise virtue, and live 
according to God’s law. Howard writes, “To live according to God’s law means to love 
your neighbor not as you would love another person, but to love him in God’s way, 
universally, as a human being. This divine type of love is expressed also by punishing the 
sinner, disciplining the lazy student, or persecuting the criminal,” (130). Augustine 
develops just war theory as a way to explain why Romans initiated some wars—as a way 
to extend discipline and peace to unruly groups. Also, Augustine is not overly critical of 
social institutions such as slavery because he believes some people’s sinful nature needs 




to be subdued. Howard then turns to those critical of the church—the Pelagians (who 
argue that people are free to pursue salvation despite original sin) and the Donatists (who 
argue that the purity of the church is compromised when they interfere with secular 
affairs). Augustine’s justification of church authority wins out, and the Donatists are 
outlawed. Still, questions about church authority persist. Howard writes, “Yet the 
millennium called the ‘Dark Age,’ from around 500 to 1500 CE, was not simply a period 
of stagnation; it was a span of time when conflicts were ripening, institutions were 
forming, and social life was being recomposed,” (137). Monasticism develops as a way 
for those seeking a spiritual life and knowledge to withdraw from the secular world. Yet, 
this way of life proves to bring prosperity and power to monasteries that sometimes 
pervert this goal. At the same time, the problem of investiture arises where secular 
authorities aim to appoint church leaders, universities develop as place to train secular 
leaders for political functions, and, the rediscovery of Aristotle’s work challenges some 
of the Platonic ideas of Augustine. St. Thomas emerges as leader of the church who 
attempts to legitimize its authority and unite the secular and sacred by drawing on this 
“new” Aristotelian influence. Thomas outlines four types of law—eternal law, natural 
law, human law, and divine law. Howard writes, “The interrelation of these four types of 
law apparently permits Thomas to overcome the distinction between the secular and the 
sacred… human laws regulate only external behavior, not private thoughts and intentions. 
As a result, human law is limited to the public sphere; the rest of man’s 
existence…remains the province of divine law,” (149-150). Like Augustine, Thomas 
believes that human laws are necessary to help humans act virtuously and overcome sin 
in accord with divine law. Yet, God’s presence in the secular world is also necessary 
because without it human society would be impossible due to human’s corrupted nature. 
Howard then turns to those who dissent—John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and 
Marsilius of Padua. He argues that these thinkers reject the unity of the sacred and secular 
that Thomas worked to achieve and move political theory out of the Dark Age and 
toward the Reformation, which he takes up in the next chapter.  
 
Chapter 4 deals primarily with the Renaissance and Reformation. Howard notes that 
while the Renaissance is usually associated with the secular world and political ideals and 
the Reformation is associated with spiritual renewal and antipolitical ideals, he believes 
they are both a type of renewal of a purer past. He examines Martin Luther, John Calvin, 
and Niccolo Machiavelli claiming that all three thinkers “shared the premise that the 
legitimacy of men’s relations to one another (and to God) was to be sought in their 
behavior in this world,” (163). Howard first explain the move toward humanism—the 
belief that people can achieve salvation through their own actions—as a way to provide 
background for Luther’s ideas. Luther rejects this aspect of humanism and holds that it is 
through God’s grace that humanity finds redemption. Howard places Luther in the 
Augustinian-Platonic camp on a “quest for purity rather than the more intellectual 
Thomist-Aristotelian search for a synthesis of religion and the world,” (166). Luther, 
tired of corruption and searching for spiritual purity, has two main beliefs that will define 




his actions: only faith can bring salvation and truth is found in scriptures only (167-168). 
This leads Luther to post the Ninety-five Theses for which he is famous. When Luther 
will not take back his beliefs, he is excommunicated by the church. Yet, Luther’s 
message continues to spread due to new printing technology available at the time. Despite 
the firmness of his beliefs, Luther must still grapple with how this plays out in the world. 
Howard wonders: “Can worldly power reform sacred institutions?” (170). Like 
Augustine, Luther concludes that true Christians will act according to the word of God, 
but secular law is necessary to bind the unjust to God’s law. Furthermore, the Christian 
doctrine to love one’s neighbor forces the Christian to accept secular authority which 
helps rule a neighbor who may not be Christian.  
 
John Calvin, on the other hand, takes up the Thomist-Aristotelian position. Howard 
writes, “Calvin’s theology was built around an ecclesiology that legitimated the reformed 
church as the mediator between the divine and the profane, the sacred and the secular. In 
this way, it replaced the one-sidedness of the Lutheran understanding of the political but 
opened itself to the danger that the Calvinist church would destroy the autonomy of 
political life by enfolding it in ecclesial life,” (181). Calvin’s faith was rooted in his belief 
in predestination, which means a believer is predetermined to be saved regardless of her 
actions on earth. Instead of leaving the political world to be cared for by others, the 
Calvinist goes out into this world and is involved in it. Calvin argues that there are three 
main actors involved in politics: the magistrates (the guardians of the law), the laws 
themselves, and the people (who follow laws that must not conflict with God’s dictates) 
(183). On this basis, Calvin wonders whether the people have the right to disobey 
tyrannical laws. Although Calvin ultimately concedes that the best hope for citizens in the 
face of tyranny is that God will punish the unjust, Howard argues that this idea lays the 
foundation for John Locke (whom he discusses in chapter 5).  
 
In chapter 4, Howard also examines Machiavelli, whom he argues belongs in chapter 4 
because he offers an investigation of “pure theory” (189). Howard claims that 
Machiavelli is aware that power is distinct from force and that power must be 
legitimated.  He further asserts that Machiavelli’s ideas can rightly be claimed to be 
amoral, but not necessarily immoral. “Although Machiavelli never states it explicitly, this 
basic insight guides his thought: politics is necessary because society is never fully 
reconciled with itself, harmony is never permanent, unity cannot be total. That is why he 
does not offer political advice to actual or potential rulers, but instead warns against 
political illusions that blind the rulers or the people to the existence of conflict, passions, 
and interests,” (194). Howard argues that these illusions are the foundation of antipolitics. 
He claims that for Machiavelli, the prince must avoid these illusions. Howard claims that 
Machiavelli’s aim in The Discourses is different: “In the place of the illusory quest for a 
republican prince who could unify a divided society, freedom is now to be both cause and 
effect of republican politics,” (200). Machiavelli wonders about the role of a modern, 
civil religion that can bring freedom and political legitimacy to a republic. Howard 




adeptly notes that this will be fruit for thought for Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whom he 
discusses next.  
 
In chapter 5, Howard takes up the philosophies of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In this chapter, political thinkers turn away from the sacred and 
attempt to find a way to truly legitimize secular rule. To achieve this end, these thinkers 
all propose social contract theories; in other words, they imagine what life for humans 
might be like before civil society (in a state of nature) and under what conditions people 
might give up their lawless freedom to enter civil society. These theories pivot on self 
interest rather than appeals to morality or divinity. Natural laws for these thinkers are 
laws that we determine through our human reason that govern us in state of nature; they 
are not related to the divine. Yet, as Howard shows, each social contract theory presented 
in this chapter is very different from the others. I particularly enjoyed Howard’s 
discussion Hobbes and Locke because he does an excellent job of comparing and 
contrasting their views.  
 
Hobbes, developing a more antipolitical Platonic theory, is both rationalist and 
materialist. Although humans are roughly equal in Hobbes’s state of nature, they live in 
constant fear and antagonism of one another. They are unable to amass private property 
and must continually seek to increase their power over others. To escape this state of war, 
the people create a contract with one another (excluding the sovereign), to live according 
to the dictates of an absolute, all-powerful ruler who will force them to comply with laws. 
Locke, on the other hand, follows a more Aristotelian direction. In his Second Treatise on 
Government, Locke describes a more moderate state of nature where humans suffer from 
inconveniences, rather than all out war. People are even able to acquire property without 
the help of an organized civil society. Howard writes, “Unity cannot be imposed on a 
modern political society from above—for instance, by the force of an absolute monarchy; 
political unity [for Locke] is instead represented by the will of the majority as it emerges 
from the interplay of diverse interests arising from the coexistence of different kinds of 
property in the state of nature,” (238). Yet, despite its aim toward diversity and away 
from absolutism, Howard still argues that Locke’s theory is antipolitical. Howard claims 
that while Locke’s political theory maintains people’s private property and freedoms, it 
fails to properly address tyranny and how the government can preserve rights in the face 
of this tyranny (245). Finally, Howard turns to Rousseau’s social contract theory, which 
Howard claims is misinterpreted by the French Revolutionaries who use it to justify the 
Terror. For Rousseau, humans “alienate” their natural freedom in order to become 
politically equal to one another. People maintain their own particular wills and desires 
(the “will of all”), but also gain a perspective as a citizen committed to a common good 
of the whole (the “general will”) which can never err (252). The general will is what 
makes the laws; the government is charged with carrying out the general precepts of the 
general will and applying it to particular cases. Rousseau does not argue for a democratic 
government because the people will be unable to apply the more general precepts to 




particular cases without involving their own self interests. Thus, for Rousseau, only the 
most virtuous citizens should apply the laws to particular cases. Howard argues that this 
is where the French Revolutionaries misappropriate Rousseau. Revolutionaries claimed 
that they were virtuous citizens applying the particulars of the unerring general will 
(267). In this chapter, I would have liked to see more analysis by Howard about whether 
or not Rousseau’s theory was antipolitical or not. While I appreciated his historical 
analysis of Rousseau and how his theory affected the French Revolution, I am still 
interested in Howard’s insight into how Rousseau measures up with Hobbes and Locke.  
 
Although much new material is presented in chapter 6, Howard begins this chapter by 
briefly summarizing what he has done so far in the book and linking it to the content of 
this chapter. Here he gathers the antipolitical strands he has discussed, points to why they 
are antipolitical, and alludes to how the antipolitical changes with the emergence of new 
ideas discussed in chapter 6. He writes: 
 
The antipolitical philosophy that began with Plato opposed an ideal world 
to a real one. Whether Plato’s Ideas, Augustine’s City of God, Luther’s 
Christian prince, or Hobbes’s absolute monarchy, there was always a gap 
between the fact and the norm, the particular and the universal, the real 
and the ideal. A similar distinction is present in those aspects of the 
Aristotelian tradition that were at times tempted by antipolitics. Classical 
antipolitics was philosophical; whether Platonic or Aristotelian, it 
enclosed the particular within the universal. As modern individualism 
became the shared premise of citizens and philosophers alike, a change 
occurred. Now all of the sources of antipolitics are found within the world 
itself. Classical transcendence is replaced by modern immanence. As a 
result, modern antipolitics is antiphilosophical; it tries to universalize the 
particular, to absolutize the individual, and to value tradition over reason. 
The invention of political economy [by Adam Smith], the revolutionary 
overthrow of the ancient regime [in the French Revolution], and the 
emergence of conservative thought [by Edmund Burke] as a reaction to 
those two transformations may have brought political thought to the end of 
its possibilities. (273) 
 
Thus in chapter 6, Howard wonders whether this is the end of political philosophy. He 
begins this discussion with Adam Smith and the idea of a political economy. He 
summarizes not only Smith’s Wealth of Nations but also his Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
He explains how Smith develops his ideas about division of labor and how these ideas 
lead to a change in the role of government. It is the desire for profit and efficiency that 
unify society and propel it forward. The role of government is only national defense, to 
create and maintain public works, and to protect citizens from injustice (286). Howard 
claims that the economy is now political—and this fact is antipolitical. Howard then 




examines to the antipolitics of the French Revolution. This section of chapter 6 is a bit 
complex, as Howard does not track one main political thinker, but the many ideas that 
influenced this tumultuous time. He discusses the decline of the French monarchy and the 
ideas that lead up to the Revolution. In particular, he examines Jacobinism led by 
Robespierre. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Revolutionaries attempt to follow 
the general will but tolerate no resistance to this will. They focus on future promises and 
ignore the means to achieve this future. Howard claims that as citizens grapple with 
current problems, they are sometimes led to examine the past. This is precisely what 
Edmund Burke does as he develops conservatism, which Howard also labels as 
antipolitical. Howard points out that conservatism emerges in conjunction with 
revolution, as conservatism seeks to critique revolution with the “tools of judgment and 
prudence, instructed by experience, tempered by tradition, and nurtured by history,” 
(310). Yet, in the end, Burke’s ideas are antipolitical because they do not promote a 
political alternative to revolution and they are absolute. Howard now turns to the 
aftermath of the American Revolution; specifically, he examines the contributions of the 
Federalists—defenders of the new American constitution. Howard does not specifically 
state that this is a move toward the political, but he uses this examination as a way to 
answer the question of chapter 6 in the negative; is this the end of political philosophy? 
The answer is no. The arguments contained in The Federalist (written by James Madison, 
Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay under the name “Publius”) balance the need for 
individualism and diversity with the unity of a republic. It is political (as opposed to 
antipolitical) because it explains how a balance of powers is to work in America; it 
combines “popular sovereignty and political representation” (325). Howard stresses the 
election of Thomas Jefferson because it is the first peaceful passage of political power 
between opposed political parties in history. Thus, the new American republic does not 
fall apart when opposing ideas are presented. Rather, it is strengthened by political 
dialogue and the emergent theory.  
 
Howard offers only a brief conclusion to his long, detailed book. He argues that his book 
can serve as a guide to political as well as antipolitical thought as it has emerged through 
history. He writes, “…the study of the past can free us from illusions about both the 
possibilities and the limits of the present. Above all, that study makes clear the 
impossibility of eliminating the political. As a result, it encourages the search for the 
modern form that the political might adopt…” (330). I wondered at times why Howard 
focused on certain thinkers while omitting others. While this explanation would be 
interesting to me, I can also understand why he does not include it here. This text is thick 
with information and the main thinkers he presents here do tie together to tell a story of 
how the political gives way to the antipolitical. I liked how they built upon one another 
and Howard was able to maintain the threads of Platonism and Aristotelianism 
throughout. As I stated earlier, I would have liked to see conclusions more explicitly 
drawn and terminology more overtly defined; doing this would have satisfied my desire 
for a deeper understanding of Howard’s insights. So much historical ground is covered 




that the philosophical analysis of this history is sometimes understated or left out. Yet, I 
do not think it is a fault of the book to have omitted this deeper analysis. Perhaps more 
analysis may have made this book more complicated and dense. Howard has met his 
stated goal of outlining many major strands of political theory from ancient times through 
the French and American Revolutions. I would recommend his book for the serious 
reader of history who wants to have a comprehensive picture of political thought.  
